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Abstract
Much of the research on communication and democ-
racy continues to lean on Jürgen Habermas’s work. How-
ever, many aspects of his approach have been intensely 
criticised in recent debates, both in communication 
studies and political theory. Habermas’s emphasis on ra-
tional consensus as the aim of public communication has 
particularly been problematised. One of the most promi-
nent critics, Chantal Mouff e and her agonistic model of 
democracy, have increasingly drawn the interest of media 
scholars. Mouff e explicitly contrasts the dominant Haber-
masian concept of the public sphere, and it appears that 
her model is impossible to combine with the Habermasian 
approach. But how substantial are the diff erences? What 
are the disagreements centred on? And what are their 
consequences for empirical media and communication re-
search? In this article we argue that rather than accepting 
the standard readings or polar positions accredited to the 
two, we need to retain a certain “theoretical eclecticism” 
in combining normative theories with empirical research. 
Despite their controversies, we argue that both Habermas’s 
and Mouff e’s theories have value as critical perspectives 
that help us refl ect on the ideals of democratic public 
communication.
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Introduction
Much research on the media and political communication tends to lean, o en 
implicitly, on Jürgen Habermas’s (1962/1989; 1984; 1987; 1992/1996) work on the 
public sphere and deliberative democracy. Yet, many aspects of Habermas’s ap-
proach have been intensely contested in recent social and political theory, which 
has also raised doubts over its relevance in media and communication studies. 
One of the most controversial points is Habermas’s focus on rational consensus as 
the ideal for communication in the public sphere. For many critics this not only 
remains a utopian, but even an undesirable ideal. 
In many strands of media and communication studies, Habermas is read as 
defending an outdated and overtly pessimistic ideal of a unitary public sphere 
which has li le relevance in contemporary societies. Critics have called for a “more 
catholic conception” of communication also “appreciative of its gloriously rau-
cous” features (Peters 1993, 567), and suggested that Habermas’ theoretical model 
is needlessly constrained by his emphasis on rational communication (Aksoy and 
Robins 2003, 373; Dahlgren 1995, 98; Jacka 2003). These readings are even coupled 
to personal descriptions. Habermas’s use of rock concerts as an example of occa-
sional publics compelled Ken Hirschkop (2004, 49) to comment: “Rock concerts? 
Habermas? I’m sure many people’s ﬁ rst reaction, however trivial and foolish, was 
to wonder whether Professor Habermas had ever been to a rock concert.” In light 
of the criticism, it is tempting to look for fresher alternatives.
One of the most prominent alternative approaches in recent democratic theory 
is provided by Chantal Mouﬀ e (Mouﬀ e and Laclau 1985; Mouﬀ e 1993, 2000, 2005) 
in her critique of deliberative democracy. Mouﬀ e’s radical-pluralist theory of ago-
nistic democracy places questions of power at the centre of politics, and points 
to collective passions as its driving force. Rather unsurprisingly, the approaches 
of Habermas and Mouﬀ e are o en considered to represent the opposite ends in 
contemporary political philosophy. The incommensurability of the two approaches 
is persistently stressed also by Mouﬀ e herself (Carpentier and Cammaerts 2006; 
Moe 2006). But behind the contrasting rhetoric, are the two theoretical approaches 
really that oppositional? If so, how substantial are the diﬀ erences? What are the 
disagreements centred on? And what are their consequences for empirical media 
and communication research?
We argue that there is a tendency within the ﬁ eld of media and communication 
studies to accept too readily these polarised readings. This is further emphasised 
by the fact that the two theorists have become popular within diﬀ erent strands of 
research. Habermas’s public sphere thesis has served above all as a basis for at-
tempts to connect political theory and critical political economy of communication 
(e.g. Garnham 1986; 1992; Scannell 1989). Mouﬀ e’s approach, in contrast, has been 
employed mainly as counter-narrative to the Habermasian approach, and scholars 
in media and cultural studies have used it to promote perspectives that take into 
account not only rational debate but also emotions, passions and identity (see 
Karppinen 2007). Consequently, their ideas have o en become means to support 
other arguments in existing polemics.
In this article we question polarised readings and examine more closely their 
use as normative theories. We discuss the application of Mouﬀ e’s and Habermas’s 
7theoretical approaches in media and communication studies with an aim to clarify 
their converging and diverging points. Despite clashing points of departure, we 
argue that rather than accentuating their incommensurability we should aim for 
dialectical engagement that perhaps even allows for combining their insights.
We ﬁ rst discuss the two approaches’ fundamental starting points. This leads to 
our argument, based on two key issues for media and communication research: 
their normative power and their ideals for democratic communication. We then il-
lustrate our argumentation by way of two examples: The ﬁ rst examines the theories’ 
normative potential in macro-analyses of media policy, concerning particularly the 
uses of Habermas and Mouﬀ e in understanding the societal role of public service 
broadcasting. The second case concerns the implications of the two theories for 
evaluating new deliberative arrangements set out to improve communication 
between citizens and politicians.
Differing Starting Points
As noted, Habermas’s notion of the public sphere and his deliberative conception 
of democracy have dominated much recent theorising on the role of the media in 
democracy. Presenting her work as critique of this stand, Mouﬀ e claims that civil 
society is not harmonious or unitary, but rather characterised by conﬂ icts of inter-
est and an irreducible pluralism of values. Consequently, the aims of deliberative 
democracy to generate rational consensus and social unity are seen as one-dimen-
sional and necessarily exclusive.
A fundamental notion in Mouﬀ e’s theory is antagonism, the tendency to clas-
sify ourselves and others in terms of them and us. For Mouﬀ e, trying to reconcile 
these tensions and conceive of the citizenry as a uniﬁ ed group ignores the inher-
ent and unavoidable nature of pluralism and conﬂ icts. Thus, Mouﬀ e comes close 
to a kind of ontological atomism or perspectivism that resonates with theories of 
postmodernism. It suggests that we are trapped in our own imagined worlds and 
perspectives, and that there is no way we can fully understand other people, other 
groups and their claims. Habermas, in contrast, remains faithful to the ideals of 
Enlightenment and emphasises that we should at least try to break loose from our 
perspectives and strive for some kind of universal understanding or consensus. 
Even though he admits that such consensus is rarely reached, Habermas continues 
to insist that we must go on assuming that consensus is in principle possible for 
otherwise political disputes would degenerate into purely strategic struggles for 
power (Baumeister 2007, 488).
In a way, the tension between the two theorists reﬂ ects also the division of 
democratic theories into those oriented to democratising or rationalising the pro-
cedures of decision-making and those conﬁ ned more explicitly to the processes 
of resistance and contestation as inherently valuable. As Bonnie Honig (1993, 2) 
writes, the radical-pluralist approach ﬁ nds its justiﬁ cation above all as a critique of 
political theorists that measure their success by the elimination of dissonance and 
conﬂ ict. Instead of conﬁ ning politics to the tasks of building consensus or consoli-
dating communities and identities, the radical pluralist approach aims to shi  the 
emphasis of democratic politics to the processes of dislocation, contestation and 
resistance. In line with this understanding, Mouﬀ e’s contribution too has o en been 
used as a tool for criticising the ﬂ aws and biases of existing approaches, rather than 
for institutional proposals or solutions to concrete political questions.
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There is no necessary reason, however, to treat these logics as fully incompat-
ible. Instead we argue that they can be seen as two necessary perspectives to the 
democratisation of any social institutions. As Honig (1993, 205) notes, politics 
consists of practices of both se lement and unse lement, and of both disruption 
and administration. Ultimately, these are perhaps best understood as co-existing 
impulses of political life, rather than as opposing ideologies. Therefore, we need 
to move beyond the polarities associated with Mouﬀ e and Habermas and examine 
more closely the various modes of critique the theories enable.
Our ﬁ rst argument for challenging the thesis of incommensurability is based 
on the two theories' status as normative theories of democracy. We argue that the 
two approaches oﬀ er diﬀ erent modes of critique that may o en be in contradiction. 
Still, they could both be used – even simultaneously – as perspectives that reveal 
problems and shortcomings in political and social reality.
Secondly, we aim to show that many of the polarised views of Habermas and 
Mouﬀ e are arguably based on a rather simpliﬁ ed reading of current debates in 
democratic theory. Habermas’s later work, for instance, can be seen as advocating 
a much more plural conception of public spheres than his critics would concede. 
Similarly, Mouﬀ e is o en accused of postmodern relativism that does not fully re-
ﬂ ect her work. Instead of two radically diﬀ erent camps, much of the contemporary 
democratic theory would seem to converge in accepting a model of multiple and 
overlapping networks of publicity, within which diﬀ erent types of communication 
can take place. Hence, we argue that the public sphere is best understood as an 
arena of articulating expressions of both solidarity and diﬀ erence, and in a general 
sense, this understanding is shared by both Mouﬀ e and Habermas.
Normative Power
To understand the potential contribution of these kinds of theories for media 
and communication studies, we need to consider their status as normative theories. 
According to Seyla Benhabib (1986), political philosophy by its nature oscillates 
between the utopian and the empirical. Critical theory always involves a utopian 
element, commitment to the aims of emancipation, and autonomy of the ratio-
nal subject. For Habermas, this commitment to critical theory and the project of 
Enlightenment has always been central as he a empts to create an emancipatory 
theory of society (Roderick 1986).
Mouﬀ e, on the other hand, draws much of her inspiration from a sort of 
neo-Nietzschean, or postmodern scepticism towards the claims of rationalism 
and universalism. She sees her project as an a empt to accept and live with the 
illusionless condition of complexity, pluralism and contradiction (Mouﬀ e 2000, 
61). Yet she refutes accusations of nihilism and relativism o en directed against 
postmodern and poststructuralist theory by emphasising the political as a distinct 
ethos that informs and enables an open-ended struggle for democratisation (Mouﬀ e 
1993, 145). For her, political philosophy does not assume a rational foundation for 
democracy, freedom or autonomy, but rather stresses that concepts and traditions 
are open to a plenitude of interpretations. The very role of philosophy is to oﬀ er 
such interpretations. Arguably, both approaches thus constitute a distinct norma-
tive and critical approach to politics.
9To ground our argument for dialectical engagement that would countenance 
both kinds of theories, we can draw on Iris Marion Young’s understanding of the 
role of critical theory. According to Young (2000), we can talk of critical theory as a 
general theoretical approach; meaning socially and historically situated normative 
analysis and argument. The theoretical aim of normative critical theory, then, is to 
construct accounts of ideals that articulate diﬀ erent feelings and render them to 
more systematic concepts. Ideals are not descriptions or blueprints that correspond 
to reality. Instead, they allow thinkers and actors to reﬂ ect on reality from a dis-
tance, reveal deﬁ ciencies in contemporary political arrangements and to envision 
alternative future possibilities.
From this perspective, we can start to understand both Habermas and Mouﬀ e 
as contributions pointing to certain ideals. Neither oﬀ ers a blueprint of the ideal 
world. Yet, both can reveal deﬁ ciencies and oﬀ er further alternative imaginaries 
or serve as interpretative hypotheses for analyses of everyday communication. Or, 
they may form the basis for new research questions, and help illuminate structures 
and relations hitherto obscured for the researcher (see Peters 1994, 70ﬀ ).
This also applies to empirical analyses of communication processes: the ideals do 
not only function to demonstrate that all communication is imperfect. Ricardo Blaug 
(1997, 108) argues that Habermas’s theory lets us discuss the degree of imperfection, 
since the “fairness of an actual discourse is a ma er of asymptotic approximation 
to the ideal.” Our claim is that such a role is suitable also for Mouﬀ e’s approach. 
Both theories may contribute to “inform an analysis of particular political cultures, 
to ground a critique of democratic institutions and to reveal the(ir) normative 
content” (Blaug 1997, 111). 
Public Communication: Consensus and Conﬂ ict
To further elaborate our argument, we focus on the tension between consensus 
and conﬂ ict as one key disagreement that separates Habermas’s and Mouﬀ e’s theo-
ries. Models of deliberative democracy and the public sphere, in particular, have 
recently been increasingly criticised for overemphasising social unity and rational 
consensus. In the approaches informed by deliberative democracy, the role of the 
public sphere and public communication is conceptualised in terms of the public 
use of reason of free and equal citizens. It provides a norm of rational-critical 
deliberation, which is free from state and corporate interests, inclusive, aimed at 
understanding and agreement, reasoned, and reﬂ exive (Benhabib 1996; Habermas 
1992/1996). As certain social institutions evidently encourage this type of com-
munication more than others, it thus provides an explicitly normative framework 
against which to assess them.
For many critics, however, this delivers an overtly rationalist conception of the 
public sphere which, despite claims that it makes room for diﬀ erence, fails to ad-
equately theorise pluralism and power. Drawing from theorists like Foucault and 
Lyotard, critics see that the deliberative emphasis on communicative reason leads 
inevitably to support the status quo in terms of existing exclusions and inequalities. 
This is because it fails to acknowledge the normalising tendencies involved in the 
designation of a particular form of communication as the rational, democratically 
legitimate norm (e.g. Fraser 1992; Villa 1992). The general thrust of deliberative de-
mocracy is thus seen as too dependent on the view that a benign social order must 
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be grounded in the ideal of consensus. While social reality is increasingly conceived 
as a chaotic situation of diversity and pluralism, the insistence on consensus is seen 
as too idealised, too unrealistic, and too academic (see Rescher 1993).
It is in that sense Mouﬀ e (2000, 93) contests “the search for a ﬁ nal rational 
resolution.” Instead, her model places questions of power at the centre of politics 
– thereby contrasting a concept of a public sphere where these processes ideally 
are eradicated. Since she sees civil society as characterised by conﬂ icts of interest 
and an irreducible pluralism of values, any system of rational consensus is not 
only utopian, but also dangerous. Each consensus should therefore be taken as 
merely a passing result of a temporary hegemony or as a momentary stabilisation 
of power.
If the theories of deliberative democracy have essentially tried to ground the 
legitimacy of democracy on agreement among rational inquirers, Mouﬀ e argues 
that:
The belief in the possibility of a universal rational consensus has put demo-
cratic thinking on the wrong track. Instead of trying to design the institu-
tions which, though supposedly “impartial” procedures, would reconcile 
all conﬂ icting interests and values, the task for democratic theorists and 
politicians should be to envisage the creation of a vibrant “agonistic” public 
sphere of contestation where diﬀ erent hegemonic political projects can be 
confronted (Mouﬀ e 2005, 3).
The public sphere should thus provide channels for the expression of collective 
passions. It should allow for identiﬁ cation around clearly diﬀ erentiated positions 
and the possibility of choosing between real alternatives. For Mouﬀ e, the task of 
democratic politics, then, is not to remove passions from the public sphere. Rather, 
passions should be mobilised towards democratic designs. 
Yet, despite the stark language, it can be argued that much of the criticism, 
Mouﬀ e’s work included, is based on a rather simpliﬁ ed reading of deliberative 
democracy and especially Habermas’s later work. The la er can be seen as advo-
cating a much more plural conception of public spheres (see Brady 2004, Dahlberg 
2005). While consensus was a signiﬁ cant component of early deliberative theory, 
later contributions have signiﬁ cantly modiﬁ ed its role and deliberative democratic 
theory has moved beyond a purely reason-centred and consensus-oriented em-
phasis (Dryzek 2000, Young 2000, Mansbridge et al 2006). John Dryzek and Simon 
Niemeyer (2006), for instance, have proposed the concept of meta-consensus, which 
refers to agreement on the legitimacy of certain positions. In this version, we do not 
have to envision deliberating individuals as aiming for ﬁ nal agreement, as long as 
they acknowledge each other and the legitimacy of opinions that diﬀ er.
With this, Dryzek and Niemeyer are a empting to respond to criticisms directed 
against deliberative democracy. Interestingly, even though they start from diverging 
points of departures, they end up in a position not far from Mouﬀ e’s: While Mouﬀ e 
argues for an agonistic democracy as a way for parties in conﬂ ict to live together 
without having to rely on violence, Dryzek and Niemeyer argue for deliberation 
between people accepting each other’s colliding positions as legitimate.   
In fact, many of the newer contributions to deliberative democracy now seem 
to agree on the need to move away from a unitary and consensual model of the 
public sphere. Seyla Benhabib, for instance, uses Hannah Arendt’s concept of “en-
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larged mentality” to refer to the broadening of horizons through coming to see 
the perspective of others in and through political and moral struggle (Benhabib 
2002, 115, 142; 1992, 89-112). There is no presumption then that moral and politi-
cal dialogues will produce normative consensus, yet it is assumed that even when 
they do not, the dialogues in the public sphere will articulate a civic perspective 
of enlarged mentality.
The revised understanding promotes not a unitary, but a pluralistic model, 
where public spheres are viewed as multiple and overlapping networks of publicity, 
within which diﬀ erent types of communication can take place. The public sphere 
is an arena of articulating expressions of both solidarity and diﬀ erence, and in a 
general sense, this understanding is shared by both Mouﬀ e and the revised ver-
sions of deliberative democracy. 
The question is therefore not which one is the essence of democracy. Consensus 
and conﬂ ict are two co-existing impulses of political communication and political 
life in general. William Connolly (1991, 94) has underlined that humans are essen-
tially incomplete without social form; a common language, institutional se ing, 
set of traditions, and political forum for articulating public purposes are indispens-
able to the acquisition of an identity and the commonalities essential to life. But 
every form of social order also contains subjugations within it. Politics, then, is the 
medium through which these ambiguities can be engaged and confronted. It is a 
medium through which common purposes are crystallised, but also a medium 
through which they can be contested, exposed and unse led (Connolly 1991, 94).
When framed in this manner, it can be argued that the diﬀ erences between 
Habermas’s theory of deliberative democracy and Mouﬀ e’s radical pluralist ap-
proach are more a ma er of emphasis than a true ideological polarity. Contrary 
to some readings, neither Habermas nor Mouﬀ e would embrace full consensus or 
unlimited pluralism. Not disregarding diﬀ erences, we argue that an openness to 
potential combinations of the two approaches might have positive implications for 
media and communication research. We now turn to illustrate some of these by 
way of two empirical examples; concentrating on the normative founding for media 
policy, and our understanding of democratic interpersonal communication.
Implications for Media and Communication Research
In the following we test the eclectic a itude, outlined above, with two diﬀ er-
ent cases. The ﬁ rst case concerns the uses of Habermas’s and Mouﬀ e’s theories in 
understanding and formulating the societal role of public service broadcasting. 
The second case concerns the implications for assessing the workings of new ar-
rangements set out to improve communication between citizens and politicians 
explicitly inspired by theories of deliberative democracy. While the ﬁ rst challenges 
the theories’ normative potential in macro analyses of media policy, the la er mo-
bilises the theories in micro analyses of face-to-face communication within formal 
political institutions. The two examples thus represent quite diﬀ erent contexts in 
the wide spectrum of media and communication research.
Public Service Broadcasting and Democracy
From the 1980s, Habermas’s public sphere thesis unleashed a wealth of aca-
demic discussion, which in an exceptional way has brought together social and 
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political theorists and critical political economists of the media. The la er group 
mobilised the Habermasian public sphere approach as a normative backbone in 
debates on media structure and policy, and in particular, in defence of public service 
broadcasting (see Moe & Syvertsen forthcoming). In early-1980s Britain, Nicholas 
Garnham felt the Le  merely provided “mealy-mouthed support” of public service 
broadcasting (Garnham 1986, 40). To change this, he sought to reformulate its value 
base by reaching for Habermas’ concept of the public sphere. In Garnham’s (1986, 
41) reading of Habermas’s early works, the public sphere was a “space for rational 
and universalistic politics.” And precisely this rational potential was stressed in a 
defence of public service. 
In eﬀ ect, Garnham introduced public sphere theory to Anglophone broadcast-
ing research. Several key works in the years that followed took a Habermasian 
approach to study issues of media and democracy (e.g. Blumler 1992; Garnham 
1992; Keane 1991). Clearly, the contributions’ insights advanced our understanding 
of relations between the media and democracy. They also entered very pertinent 
political debates, and counterbalanced the prevailing more cynical approach.
Yet, these studies are also problematic on several levels: ﬁ rst, they tended to 
portray public service broadcasting as the “institutional guarantor and instrument 
of the modern public sphere” (Collins 1992/2002, 66). Practices of public service 
broadcasting have historically never corresponded to the ideal public sphere. Nor 
do they automatically ﬁ t a future realisation or approximation. Second, especially 
early works by British scholars held the market and public service as incompatible 
principles of organisation: a market organisation of broadcasting was irreconcilable 
with democracy (see Collins 1992/2002, 69). Thirdly, the contributions in question 
built on Habermas’ early public sphere theory, which carried with it some diﬃ  cult 
biases – especially towards rationality (but see Dahlgren 1995).
In light of this, it might seem surprising that the implications of the agonistic model 
for the media have not been debated more o en. In fact, it appears that the lack of 
institutional proposals or interest in concrete political questions is a rather general 
feature among the postmodern theorists of radical diﬀ erence and pluralism (Dahl-
gren 2004, 15ﬀ ; McLennan, 1995, 85). These perspectives have thus been used more 
as oppositional discourses or tools in criticising various monisms, such as the rational 
bias, of media studies and critical political economy. They have not been mobilised as 
coherent normative theories pertaining to questions of media structure and policy.
In public service broadcasting research, this criticism further tends to linger with 
an early Habermasian ideal. Cultural studies scholar Elizabeth Jacka (2003) is a case 
in point, a acking a “modern” defence of public service, calling it unnecessarily 
pessimistic and one-dimensional. She focuses on Garnham’s work, claiming it is 
based on an outdated and indefensible theoretical ideal of a unitary public sphere 
with li le relevance in today’s society. Jacka brings due a ention to the dominant 
approach’s prioritisation of “high modern” journalism, and corresponding neglect 
of ﬁ ctional television forms. While it is important to question the devaluation of 
commercially funded providers’ potential value in the public sphere, for our dis-
cussion, Jacka’s argument suﬀ ers at two points. 
First, as Garnham (2003) stresses in his reply, although newer contributions are 
referred to, the key works she addresses are almost 20 years old. And the theoretical 
ideals they build on are even older. As we have stressed, a Habermasian unitary 
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model of the public sphere has now been superseded by more comprehensive and 
ﬂ uid conceptualisations of the media and the public sphere. Clearly, considering 
what we have called sophisticated deliberative theory would at least somewhat 
diminish the power of Jacka’s criticism.
Second, Jacka does not ascribe any normative power to Mouﬀ e’s theory. In fact, 
Jacka seems sceptical to any use of ideals when dealing with democracy. She objects 
to a notion of democracy as an “essence” (Jacka 2003, 181), and prefers to see it as 
“ﬂ uid and evolving” (Jacka 2003, 183). This is contrasted with an ideal view, which 
leads one to “inevitably see any departure from it as a crisis” (Jacka 2003, 183). 
However, we have argued that the theory of radical pluralism is just as normative 
as the deliberative ideals and that it also prescribes an ideal form of communication 
in the public sphere. Therefore, it is highly problematic to use Mouﬀ e’s contribution 
to support a dismissal of the value of normative ideals for media and communica-
tion research. Taking the normative potential seriously, on the other hand, opens 
up new possibilities for conceptualising the role of public service.
Certainly, public service broadcasting can be presented as the institutional 
space which is best able to realise the principles of communicative action in the 
public sphere: freedom from commercial pressures, undistorted communication, 
consensual procedures, rational debate and at least ideally the expression of social 
unity. Public service broadcasting can be lauded because it is envisioned as a neutral 
space responsive to the interests of all in society, where ma ers of the public good 
can be debated, considered and ideally agreed upon – striving to approximate a 
Habermasian ideal.
On the other hand, it is equally possible to defend the ideals of public service 
broadcasting by leaning on a radical pluralist theory of agonistic democracy. 
Geoﬀ rey Craig (1999) oﬀ ers a valuable step in this direction. Establishing that 
the Australian public service institution ABC exists in a state of perpetual crisis, 
he suggests embracing conﬂ icts as the best defence: public service broadcasters 
should “generally provide spaces for, and in turn articulate, the ongoing ‘crisis’ 
which always constitutes the public life of a society” – a public life he ﬁ nds “char-
acterised by diﬀ erence and incommensurability” (Craig 1999, 113, 112). Public 
service broadcasting is thus located within a heterogeneous public which rejects 
the erasure of diﬀ erence occurring in the constitution of social unity. In a political 
and cultural environment which has promoted diﬀ erence and pluralism, argu-
ments for public service broadcasting need to consider more fully the issues of 
pluralism and conﬂ ict. Such an understanding of the democratic role of the media 
informed by an agonistic model of democracy provides an alternative to both the 
singular proliferation of private media outlets and the outmoded view of public 
broadcasting (Craig 1999, 112).
Craig’s argument is explicitly located within an agonistic model of democracy, 
and according to him irreconcilable with a model of deliberative democracy. We 
claim that such a rejection is neither needed, nor desirable: it is possible to think of 
public service broadcasting as an arena for conﬂ icting ideas and perspectives also 
from a deliberative approach. As we have argued, neither unity nor consensus is 
treated as a prerequisite in current deliberative theory. What the agonistic model 
contributes is the emphasis on exclusion as well as a richer understanding of the 
range of communication in the public sphere. 
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Public service broadcasting represents an institutional compromise that in many 
ways reﬂ ects the necessity to reconcile the needs for unity and diﬀ erence. It can be 
understood as a media policy tool, employable for diﬀ erently conceived functions 
based on diﬀ erent social and cultural aims. To theorise this role, we can proﬁ t from 
both Habermas’s and Mouﬀ e’s contributions. They are resources for conceptualising 
the diﬀ erent functions media in general, and public service versions in particular, 
may have in a democratic polity. It makes no sense to look for equivalence in the 
institutional practice of public service broadcasting and some theoretical model of 
democratic theory. Rather, diﬀ erent critical normative theories should be seen as 
valuable for reﬂ ection on those institutions, their deﬁ ciencies, shortcomings and 
promises. For conceptualisations of media policy, there are therefore advantages 
in keeping an eclectic a itude towards the two theories. The same holds when we 
turn to consider a case for micro analysis of political face-to-face communication.
The Case of Civic Communication in a Swedish Municipality
Over the last decades, traditional political activities such as voting and join-
ing political parties have declined (Thörn 2002). Citizens more frequently declare 
themselves to be dissatisﬁ ed (Bentivegna 2006). At the same time, they more o en 
use other arenas than parliamentary institutions when engaging politically. In order 
to reckon with this trend, participatory democratic projects have been introduced 
in many countries (see Gastil & Levin 2005 on the US; He & Leib 2006 on China; 
Niemeyer 2004 on Australia; Kanra 2004 on Turkey; Vera-Zavala 2003 on Brazil). 
In these participatory projects, conversation and dialogue are o en emphasised 
as both means and an end. To create dialogue between citizens and politicians is 
supposed to vitalise representative democracy (Friedman 2006). This emphasis on 
dialogue is broadly inspired by visions of deliberative democracy. 
Such is also the case in Sweden, where the government has endorsed what they 
refer to as participatory democracy with deliberative qualities (Government bill 
2001, 27). The idea heavily emphasises how democracy needs public arenas where 
opinions may be debated. As research has shown, terms like civic dialogue and 
civic inﬂ uence are frequently used on Swedish municipalities’ websites (Djörke 
2006). Further, initiatives such as referendums, civic panels, and civic oﬃ  ces are 
becoming increasingly common in Swedish municipalities (SOU 2000). Early 2003, 
in the south Swedish municipality of Helsingborg (120,000 inhabitants), the ma-
jority of the Municipal Council decided to renew its organisation and install ﬁ ve 
Civic Commi ees in geographically deﬁ ned areas of the city. The Civic Commit-
tees should foster participation and encourage dialogue between decision-makers 
and those aﬀ ected by the decisions. For this purpose, the commi ees organised 
public meetings, workshops and deliberations for residents. The aim was to create 
a constructive and deliberative dialogue.
For the present discussion, we draw on a comprehensive study of how diﬀ erent 
civic positions constructed their activities within the Civic Commi ees (Svensson 
2008b). We outline here some general ﬁ ndings and substantiate them by concen-
trating on examples from one meeting in a wealthy area in the northwest of the 
municipality. The meeting in question was organised with the local neighbourhood 
association to get an idea of the pertinent issues on the agenda in this particular 
neighbourhood. The idea was to discuss how the Civic Commi ee should continue 
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its work, and to discuss other activities in the neighbourhood. Nine members from 
the local neighbourhood association, three politicians from the commi ee, a handling 
oﬃ  cer and a coordinator from the municipal bureaucracy a ended the meeting. 
Our aim is to illustrate how both Mouﬀ e and Habermas can be used as theo-
retical tools in communication research, not only in normative discussions on the 
macro level, but also on empirical research on the micro level. By studying the 
practices of these commi ees from both radical-pluralist and deliberative perspec-
tive, it is possible to assess their diﬀ erences from an empirical point of view. Based 
on this, we argue that a combined analysis is possible, and even desirable. While 
the deliberative perspective is useful in identifying common purposes among the 
citizenry and how their diﬀ erent opinions may cohere, the agonistic perspective is 
useful in revealing mechanisms of power and hegemonic practices in the meetings 
organised by the Civic Commi ees.
Evaluating the practices of the Civic Commi ees from the perspective of agonis-
tic democracy, the focus would be on whether minority groups were able to express 
themselves and challenge hegemony. Did the commi ees provide a channel for 
the expression of diﬀ erent and conﬂ icting positions? Following Mouﬀ e, the Civic 
Commi ees should not become a public ﬁ ghting arena for diﬀ erent passions and 
groups in Helsingborg. Even though participants inevitably will disagree, they 
should conceive of each other as adversaries instead of enemies, and acknowledge 
each other’s opinions as legitimate. This would be the normative ideal to strive for, 
and to and to use for reﬂ ecting on empirical reality in Helsingborg”.
Clearly, the reality does not come close. Analysing the practices in Helsingborg 
from Mouﬀ e’s perspective there is a lot to be critical of. An initial general ﬁ nding is 
that the open meetings arranged by the Civic Commi ees largely a racted middle-
aged and old people, all mostly ethnic Swedes. This segment of the population 
was eloquent; they knew how to express themselves in a manner that a racted the 
approval of other participants, as well as politicians and municipal oﬃ  cials. Being 
able to express oneself in public appropriately, not being shy, and standing up for 
your opinions were important qualities sought in order to participate with suc-
cess in the deliberations. Even though a majority of the participants were female, 
it was mostly the male participants that made themselves heard. In smaller group 
deliberations the ideal of equal participation was approximated to greater extent, 
even though strong male participants could take over even in smaller se ings.
The failure to a ract representative participation in the activities was consid-
ered problematic by the organisers. Therefore, some commi ees explicitly targeted 
young people and immigrants by visiting youth centres and immigrant associations. 
Further, in order to get a general picture of the issues at stake, a statistical survey 
was sent out to a representative sample of the inhabitants. What seems evident 
is that the organisation of the Civic Commi ees’ activities from the outset was 
designed with the goal of rational deliberation in mind. Both the organisation of 
the meeting, and participant requirements could be seen as biased towards a form 
of communication criticised by the radical-pluralist perspective. Though the Civic 
Commi ees at least tried to reach minority groups in Helsingborg and counteract 
unrepresentative dominance of stronger citizens, they failed to realise a more fun-
damental problem: the very practices did contain mechanisms of inclusion and 
exclusion, revealing hegemonic civic positions.
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To reorient civic participation back to the municipal organisations, the Civic 
Commi ees believed that a deliberating citizenry was beneﬁ cial. Therefore, in 
order to facilitate deliberation, and position the participants as communicative, 
they explicitly stressed issues of future, everyday practices, unselﬁ sh and active 
engagement (see Svensson 2008b). For example when the Civic Commi ee vis-
ited the neighbourhood association in north-western Helsingborg, the handling 
oﬃ  cer started by presenting the Commi ees purpose to collect experiences of the 
citizens in diﬀ erent areas of the Helsingborg. She especially emphasised that they 
wanted to “catch the issues of the future so that the municipality can continue to 
work with these questions in new group constellations together with the citizens.” 
This speech act reveals an ideal image of the citizen as active and involved. The 
handling oﬃ  cer implicitly underlined that the municipality was only interested in 
discussing broader issues of the future, issues in which the residents themselves 
could be involved in an active manner. 
This positioning was important for how these residents conceived of themselves 
as citizens and what issues they felt they had the right to address. To engage ac-
tively in issues concerning the future of their everyday life, but not wanting to be 
considered too selﬁ sh, participants framed varied issues as pertaining to the welfare 
of their children (Svensson 2007). Almost all issues in the meeting in the northwest 
were addressed in a story line of being a parent. Obvious examples are building a 
bike path to a school in another residential area, reducing the speed in front of the 
school et cetera (Svensson 2007). 
The relevance of parenthood in these practices did exclude couples with no 
kids, old people, gays and lesbians. The most apparent example of exclusion in 
the meeting concerned young people on the beach, playing loud music and ge ing 
drunk. One elderly lady complained about this and asked what the municipality 
could do about the problem. Other residents immediately told her that this was 
not a ma er to discuss in a Civic Commi ee meeting – this was a ma er for the 
police. The underlying story line here was that living close to the beach in summer 
time, you have to accept the young people having some fun. This contribution in 
the meeting was not in coherence with the prevailing story line of the active citi-
zen, she was only complaining, and more importantly she was complaining about 
young people from a non-parent position. Consequently, the elderly lady’s input 
was devalued. She remained quiet for the rest of the meeting.
While the practices in this particular meeting did not reach a standard of ago-
nistic confrontation, contributions were repeatedly framed in conﬂ icting ways. By 
using an agonistic pluralist framework we could start to discern a hegemonic civic 
position; being a parent. When someone tried to challenge “the parents” in the 
meeting, they were immediately quieted. This illustrates how Mouﬀ e’s perspective 
is useful in bringing a ention to power mechanisms in the practices of the Civic 
Commi ees, and to how certain groups and their concerns were acknowledged 
to a greater extent than others.
From the perspective of deliberative democracy, the success of the Civic Commit-
tees would be assessed against the discussions’ ability to approximate the ideal of 
rational deliberation, and whether participants in the meetings developed a greater 
understanding for each other (for a further discussion on this theme see Svensson 
2008a). In deliberations, participants are not supposed to appear self-interested. 
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Ideas and demands must be inter-subjectively acceptable. Otherwise, neither con-
sensus nor reasoned agreement and meta-consensus will be possible. This ﬁ ltering 
of self-interest is what makes deliberative processes rational in a communicative 
sense. How then could we from this perspective assess the parent story line?
In the meeting, issues that were not obviously about children and being a 
parent were also addressed in the same dominant story line. For example, some 
residents argued for cleaning up the beach “so that the kids could play football.” 
Some also wanted broadband in the neighbourhood so “the kids could do bet-
ter on their homework.” While such contributions surely could be seen to make 
use of inter-subjectively acceptable support, they could also be made subject of a 
more critical analysis. These claims could be understood as a way to “dress up” 
self-interests like property values in a publicly acceptable manner. Even though 
not always explicitly spelled out, property value was a common underlying argu-
ment for opposition towards for example opposing new housing projects and road 
development. The call for cleaning up the beach could be about private monetary 
motives, rather than the public welfare of the children in the neighbourhood. This 
is something deliberative theorists would consider incompatible with the ideal 
standards of deliberation. According to deliberative theory it is people’s opinions 
that are supposed to change, not the way they present their arguments. 
The advertising practices of the Civic Commi ees also revealed this tension 
between the more Habermasian communicative rationality, and a more instrumen-
tal understanding of civic participation. When trying to motivate participation in 
ads and leaﬂ ets, the Civic Commi ees o en addressed the inhabitants in a very 
instrumental way by using phrases such as “Come and meet your politicians so you 
can tell them what you want” and “Make your voice heard.” This did create contra-
dictory expectations. On the one hand, the municipality a empted to get inhabit-
ants to deliberate about political issues. On the other hand, inhabitants expected 
implementation of policies that were important for them on a more personal level. 
When oﬃ  cials and politicians reported back to the diﬀ erent municipal councils 
and commi ees on all the deliberating inhabitants that engaged in constructive 
dialogue, the inhabitants themselves had le  the meeting expecting that something 
concrete would come out of their engagement. A racting participation using an 
instrumental address did not create expectations compatible with the deliberative 
moral of mutual understanding and searching for the be er argument. 
The Civic Commi ees were explicitly inspired by deliberative democracy (see 
Svensson 2008a). Yet, scrutiny of how these commi ees addressed the inhabitants 
reveals a discrepancy between ideals and practices. In this sense, the theoretical 
framework of Habermas is useful in discussing how instrumental arguments may 
be disguised in a more legitimate manner, as well as highlighting contradictions 
in how the commi ees addressed citizens.
Drawing from the empirical case, we can now see more clearly the beneﬁ ts of 
combining diﬀ erent theoretical approaches. While the radical-pluralist approach 
puts focus on recognising unequal relations of power and exclusionary mechanisms, 
focusing solely on the disagreements and contestations would not be to fully un-
derstand why inhabitants in Helsingborg have decided to engage in discussions 
with each other in the ﬁ rst place. On the other hand, focusing solely on the rational 
pursuit of understanding and consensus can imply ignoring the exclusionary prac-
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tices in the deliberations. Of course, both Habermas’s and Mouﬀ e’s theories operate 
on a level of abstraction that makes it diﬃ  cult to apply them directly to empirical 
research. They oﬀ er no clear framework for empirical work, and they can both be 
used for critique on multiple levels; in revealing the problems of existing practices, 
in immanent critique of outspoken ideals, or in assessing the normative content 
of broader politics. From our perspective, this only conﬁ rms the validity of our 
proposed a itude. As we have argued, normative theories are more meaningfully 
used in the eclectic sense we have outlined above, as tools that allow us to reﬂ ect 
on reality from a distance and to imagine alternative possibilities, rather than as 
grand narratives that explain social reality in totality.
Conclusion
In this article we have made a case for certain theoretical eclecticism. Yet, more 
than generalising philosophical eclecticism we argue for dialectical engagement 
with recent developments in political theory that brings the approaches of Mouﬀ e 
and Habermas closer. With a special focus on media and communication research, 
our two empirical examples illuminate that while the two approaches are not nec-
essarily theoretically compatible, in empirical studies they can complement each 
other, both in microanalysis of interpersonal communication and in macro analysis 
concerning public service broadcasting and media policy.
With few exceptions like Habermas’s (2006) recent essay Political Communication 
in Media Society, the focus of neither Habermas nor Mouﬀ e has been on the media 
or communication as such. So it is up to communication and the media scholars to 
develop their ideas, apply them and possibly combine them. While we acknowledge 
the theoretical diﬀ erences between the two and mean not to deﬂ ate them into mere 
theoretical rhetoric, our discussion also raises a more general question on the nature 
and uses of normative political theory in media and communication research. In-
stead of a dogmatic confrontation, we argue for an a itude of theoretical eclecticism 
where the role of critical theoretical reﬂ ection is more to raise questions and open 
new analytical and normative perspectives than to oﬀ er deﬁ nite answers.
In this sense, Habermas’s massive work has obviously been important in raising 
critical questions and formulating conceptualisations of ideal conditions of public 
deliberation in media and communication studies. And as we have argued, it is 
largely around his concepts that most fruitful coming together of political phi-
losophy and media studies has so far taken place. Mouﬀ e, on the other hand, has 
brought a ention to ignored sides of political communication and the democratic 
role of the media. In many ways, her critical approach can help reveal the deﬁ cien-
cies and biases of existing theoretical frameworks for understanding contemporary 
problems.
In this article we have focused particularly on the themes of consensus and 
conﬂ ict. Yet, there are many other areas where the taken-for-granted incommen-
surability of diﬀ erent strands of democratic theory could be reconsidered. The 
role of various kinds of expressive performances and ritualised encounters could 
constitute a key issue to take up when exploring these areas: How, for instance, 
can we conceptualise and assess the political function of communication that is 
neither public deliberation, nor agonistic confrontation? Such themes include, but 
are not limited to, the idea of a cultural public sphere (McGuigan 2005); storytell-
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ing, rhetoric and greeting as modes of political communication (Young 1996); or 
cultural governance as a concept in which diﬀ erent and divergent expressive forms 
and their impact on political life are considered (Bang 2003).
Without ignoring the diﬀ erences between Mouﬀ e and Habermas, we argue that 
there is no need to choose any one theoretical approach, and pretend that it oﬀ ers 
an end-all account of the nature of social and political reality. Normative theories 
can be seen as ideational resources rather than ﬁ xed approaches that prescribe a 
rigid normative criteria or description of reality. Therefore, we need to continually 
engage with political theory of diﬀ erent orientations in an eclectic manner to test 
our normative assumptions.
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